Iran’s Hidden Procurement Machine: How a Network of 5,000 Agencies Kept Military Supplies Moving
Iran has continued importing military-related equipment despite sweeping Western sanctions and a reported US naval blockade, according to a major investigation that uncovered a sprawling procurement network linked to the country’s defence establishment. The system reportedly involves more than 5,000 entities and has facilitated imports worth at least $2 billion since January 2025.
The investigation, published on October 29, 2026, examined Iranian banking records, corporate registrations, shipping documents and import data. It found that entities associated with Iran’s Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics operated through a complex structure involving intermediaries, overseas companies and financial arrangements designed to obscure the identities of buyers and the movement of funds.
The findings offer insight into how Tehran has continued obtaining materials that can support missile and drone production even as international pressure has increased. They also raise questions about the effectiveness of sanctions when military procurement is spread across numerous organisations and international commercial channels.
The investigation’s findings are based on records examined by journalists and a risk consultancy. They do not establish that every company or country appearing in the trade records knowingly participated in sanctions evasion.
More Than 5,000 Entities Under Investigation
According to the investigation, thousands of entities used names beginning with “MOD,” referring to Iran’s Ministry of Defence. Their registration records reportedly listed a common address in Tehran associated with the defence ministry and a shared founding date of February 11, 1979.
However, corporate records indicated that many of the entities were actually established in 2013, when Iran was facing intense economic pressure and restrictions on its oil exports and access to international finance.
The numbered entities appear to have formed part of a wider procurement structure rather than operating as entirely independent businesses. Their details appeared across shipping documents, invoices, banking records and other commercial information, allowing investigators to trace transactions that might otherwise have been difficult to connect.
Some entities were reportedly linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and powerful Iranian foundations known as bonyads. These foundations operate across different parts of the Iranian economy, while the IRGC has extensive military and commercial interests.
Investigators also examined the use of foreign intermediaries and companies that allegedly helped obscure the identity of the final buyers. Such arrangements can make it more difficult for suppliers, financial institutions and enforcement agencies to determine whether a transaction is connected to a restricted military programme.
How the Network Reportedly Moved Money
One of the investigation’s most striking findings concerned how payments were settled.
In 97% of the shipments reviewed, transactions were recorded as being settled without a cross-border currency transfer. This suggests that many purchases relied on financial arrangements that did not require money to move internationally in the conventional way.
The reported system used proceeds from oil sales and financial channels outside Iran to pay for imported goods. By relying on intermediaries and funds already held abroad, buyers could potentially reduce the number of transactions visible to banks monitoring cross-border payments.
This does not mean that every transaction was illegal or that all the companies involved knowingly helped Iran evade sanctions. Rather, the records suggest that investigators identified a system capable of concealing links between buyers, suppliers and the ultimate end users.
The distinction is important because sanctions enforcement depends not only on identifying restricted goods but also on proving who purchased them, where the money originated and whether the transaction violated applicable rules.
What Iran Was Importing
The investigation identified a range of imported materials and equipment with potential military applications. These included chemicals used in solid rocket-fuel production, explosives-related materials, detonators, aircraft components, precision machinery and heavy-duty vehicles.
Some of the shipments were recorded as originating in China, Russia, Germany, other European Union countries and the United Arab Emirates. A country listed as the origin of a shipment is not necessarily the same as the country of the final buyer, and the records alone do not prove that a government authorised or knowingly supported a military transaction.
Among the materials identified were sodium chlorate and other perchlorate chemicals, which can have industrial uses but are also relevant to certain rocket-propellant processes. Investigators also traced imports of titanium, a metal valued for its strength and relatively low weight, as well as industrial machinery that can be used in manufacturing components.
The potential military importance of such goods depends on their specifications, their final destination and how they are used. Many industrial materials have legitimate civilian applications, making end-user checks and reliable documentation particularly important.
A Major Importer Stood Out
One entity, identified as MOD 346428, featured prominently in the records. The investigation found that it imported goods valued at approximately $2.3 billion between January 2025 and June 2026.
Its reported purchases included chemicals associated with rocket-fuel production, explosives-related materials, aircraft parts and heavy-duty trucks. The scale of these transactions illustrates how a single organisation within a larger procurement structure can handle substantial volumes of trade.
The records also included hundreds of Iveco trucks. Vehicles of this type can be adapted for military support roles, including carrying equipment or serving as mobile platforms. However, the fact that a vehicle could be modified for military use does not establish that every imported truck was converted or deployed for that purpose.
Iveco said that any presence of its vehicles in Iran was outside its control, according to the reporting. Toyota also said it did not conduct business in Iran.
The investigation further connected some earlier vehicle transactions to Sahara Thunder, an Iranian drone-related company previously sanctioned by the United States for alleged dealings involving Russia.
Supplies Continued During the War
The investigation found that shipments continued arriving after the war began on February 28, 2026, although monthly imports fluctuated.
The records showed that imports fell sharply in March before increasing again in the following months. They also documented shipments of chemicals and other materials that could be used in weapons manufacturing.
These findings matter because military production depends on more than finished missiles or drones. It also requires a continuing supply of components, industrial equipment, chemicals, replacement parts and transport vehicles.
Even when airstrikes or other military operations damage production facilities, access to imported materials can help a country maintain or rebuild parts of its defence industry. The extent to which Iran has been able to do so depends on the condition of its factories, the availability of skilled workers and the effectiveness of restrictions on its supply routes.
The investigation does not establish that every imported item entered a weapons factory or was used in a specific attack. It does, however, document a network that reportedly continued obtaining goods with potential military applications during a period of heightened conflict.
Washington Faces Questions Over Sanctions Enforcement
The findings present a challenge for US policy. Washington has imposed extensive sanctions on Iran’s defence establishment, missile programme and entities accused of helping procure restricted equipment. The US Treasury has also announced separate enforcement actions targeting international procurement networks connected to Iranian military organisations.
In September 2026, the Treasury Department announced sanctions against 10 individuals and entities across multiple jurisdictions for alleged procurement activity supporting Iran’s defence ministry. Earlier actions also targeted networks accused of using overseas businesses and financial intermediaries to obtain restricted goods.
The newly reported network highlights the difficulty of enforcement when procurement is distributed across thousands of entities, transactions are routed through intermediaries and goods have both civilian and military uses.
A US Treasury spokesperson told the investigators that Washington had taken steps to sever Iran’s economic lifelines and remained focused on preventing the country from accessing resources for its military programmes. China’s Foreign Ministry said it was unaware of the specific situation and opposed what it described as attempts to unfairly associate China with regional hostilities. Other parties named in the investigation had not publicly responded at the time of publication.
The findings do not mean that US sanctions have had no effect. Restrictions can raise costs, delay shipments, complicate payments and limit access to advanced technology. But the investigation suggests that enforcement has not eliminated all channels through which Iran can acquire military-related supplies.
What the Findings Could Mean for the Region
Potential impact: If the network operates on the scale described, it could help Iran preserve parts of its missile and drone manufacturing capacity despite pressure on its economy and defence infrastructure. That could complicate efforts to reduce the military threat posed by Iranian weapons and increase the importance of monitoring international supply chains.
For the United States and its partners, the likely policy challenge is to improve the identification of intermediaries, verify end users and share trade intelligence across borders. Greater scrutiny of high-risk transactions could make procurement more expensive and difficult, although it could also affect legitimate commercial trade if controls are applied too broadly.
For companies, the investigation underscores the importance of checking customers, beneficial ownership, shipping routes and the intended use of sensitive equipment. Suppliers may face legal and reputational risks if their products reach restricted military users through intermediaries.
The broader geopolitical implications will depend on how governments respond and whether the reported procurement channels can be disrupted. The investigation does not, by itself, establish that any particular shipment was used in an attack or that every country identified in shipping records knowingly assisted Iran’s military.
The central finding is that Iran’s reported procurement system is more complex than a handful of front companies. It appears to involve a broad network of entities, financial arrangements and international supply channels. Understanding how that network operates may prove crucial to assessing the real reach of sanctions and the future capacity of Iran’s military industry.
